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1.  Introduction
One of  the  major  factors  now  regularly  considered  in  debates  about  the  future  of
agricultural  trade  and  policies  in  Europe  is  the  impending  Eastern  enlargement  of
the European  Union. The exact timing of that next round  of enlargement  not yet fully
clear.  The  EU  has,  though,  decided  that  accession  negotiations  with  the  first
countries  from  Central  Europe  (candidates  still  to  be  suggested  by  the  EU
Commission)  will  start  six  months  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Intergovernmental
Conference  ("Maastricht  II") on  the future  institutional structure  of the  EU,  which  is
expected  for  mid-1997.  In  other  words,  accession  negotiations  are  likely  to  start
early  in  1997.  In  past  rounds  of  EU  enlargement,  accession  negotiations  took
anywhere  between  three  and  seven  years.  Hence,  at  this  time  most  observers
believe that EU  accession of the first countries from  Central  Europe  will  be at  least
five years  down  the  road,  and  that  it will take  another five  years  or  so  before  the
majority  of  the  ten  countries  from  Central  Europe  (CEC-10)  which  now  have
association agreements  with the EU  (and therefore are candidates  for accession) will
have joined  the  Union.  It  is also  not  yet clear  in  which  sequence  the  countries  of
Central  Europe  will join the  EU.  However,  it would be  surprising  if the first  round  of
Eastern  enlargement  would  not  entail  at  least  Poland,  Hungary  and  the  Czech
Republic, and possibly more  countries.
In  spite  of  these  residual  uncertainties  about  the  process  and  speed  of  Eastern
enlargement,  the  debate  about  its  agricultural  implications  is already  in  full  swing.
The reasons are easy to understand. Agriculture is  a large sector in  Central  Europe,
and its weight in an enlarged  Union will  be considerably greater  than  in today's EU-
15.  Hence,  when  Central  Europe  joins the  EU  the  viability of the  CAP  as  it stands
today  is  under  serious  threat.  Farm  lobbies  in  the  EU  are,  therefore,  less  than
enthusiastic  about  the  prospect  of  Eastern  enlargement.  Many  farmers  in  Central
Europe,  on  the other  hand,  can  hardly  await  the  moment  they  are  admitted  to  the
Promised  Land  of CAP  benefits.  In a  situation  like that,  agriculture  can  rightly  be
described  as  one  of  the  "political  land  mines"  on  the  way  towards  Eastern
enlargement (Baldwin,  1994).
In a discussion about the agricultural implications of Eastern enlargement it is useful
to start from some factual information regarding the situation of agriculture  in Central
Europe.  Such  information  will  be  provided  in  Section  2  of this  paper.  Against this
background we can discuss the quantitative effects of extending an  unreformed CAP
to Central  Europe (Section 3).  These effects are  such that strategic decisions  on the
future of Europe's agricultural policies can hardly be avoided (Section  4).1
While the EU-15  prepares for  Eastern enlargement,  the countries  in Central  Europe
will  continue  to  puzzle  over the  nature  (if not  the  existence)  of the  CAP  they  will
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indeed should,  decisively depend  on the  outcome  of the debate  about the  future  of
the  CAP  in  the  EU-15.  However,  domestic  agricultural  policy  strategies  in  Central
Europe will not be discussed  in this  paper (but  see Tangermann  and Josling,  1994).
Another  important  element  of  agricultural  relations  between  the  EU  and  Central
Europe  is  the  treatment  of  trade  in  farm  and  food  products  pre-accession.
Preferential  arrangements  in  agriculture  under  the  association  agreements  leave
much to  be desired. This  set of issues will,  also,  not be discussed  in  this  paper  (but
see Tangermann,  1993,  and Overberg,  1996).
2.  How  Important is Agriculture in Central  Europe?
Before  going  into  any  details  on  agricultural  policy  consequences  of  EU  Eastern
enlargement,  it is useful to take note of a few facts which  illustrate the  importance  of
agriculture  in Central  Europe.
(1)  Agriculture  is much  more important to the economies of the CEC than is the
case in Western  Europe.
In  the  CEC-10,  agriculture  contributes  7.8  per  cent to  total  GDP,  more  than  three
times  as much  as  in  the  EU-15  (see  Graph  1).  Agriculture  employs  26.7  per  of  all
labour,  nearly five times  the share  in the  EU.  The share  of  agricultural  area in  total
area  in  the  CEC-10  is  above that  in the  EU.  The  share  of  food  in  total  household
expenditure in the CEC-10  (36 per cent)  is more than fifty  per cent above that in  the
EU.  All this  says that  agriculture  is  much  more  important  as an  economic  activity  in
the  CEC  than  in  the  EU.  Hence  the  attention  which  CEC  governments  pay  to
agricultural  issues  is  great  when  it  comes  to  considering  the  implications  of
accession to the  EU,  and for the  CEC  the  nature  of agricultural  policies  pursued  is
more  important than  it is for most  countries  in the  EU-15.  This  cannot, however,  be
simply taken  to indicate that CEC  governments  are  more  interested  in  higher  levels
of agricultural protection  than governments  of West  European  countries. After  all, as
food  has a  much  higher share  in total  expenditure  of CEC  consumers,  food  prices
are significantly more of a political issue than they are  in Western Europe.
(2)  As  a  consequence  of  the  large  size  of  agriculture  in  Central  Europe,  the
weight  of agriculture  in the  overall economy  of the  EU  will  grow  significantly
when it comes to Eastern  enlargement.
Accession  by  the  CEC-10  would  expand  the  size  of  agriculture  in  the  European
Union  very  considerably.  Agricultural  employment  would  grow  by  more  than  one
hundred per cent;  agricultural and arable areas  as well as cereals production would
expand by around  50 per cent;  livestock production would  grow by around  one fifth
(see Graph 2). On the other hand, enlargement to include the CEC-10  would  add no
more than just three per cent to the size of the overall economy of the EU  (measured
by GDP at current prices).  By the time  Eastern  enlargement  will actually take place,
some of these indicators will  have changed. In particular, agricultural employment  in
Central  Europe  is  likely to  shrink,  and  GDP  in  Central  Europe  will  probably  grow
faster than in the EU-15.  Nevertheless,  Eastern enlargement  will  make  agriculture  in
the  Union  grow  much  more  than  the  overall  economy.  As  a  result,  the  economic
conditions  under  which  agricultural  policies will  have  to  be  pursued  in  an  enlarged
Union  will  be  much  different from  what  they  are  in  the  current  Union.  In particular,
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agriculture will have to consider that,  in  an enlarged  Union,  agriculture  will  be much
larger relative  to  the  rest of the  economy.  At  the same  time,  the  political  weight  of
agricultural  interests  in  society  may  gain  significantly  as  a  result  of  Eastern
enlargement.
(3)  The  size  of  individual  countries  in  Central  Europe,  and  of  their  agriculture,
differs greatly from country to country.
The  largest  country  among  the  CEC-10,  measured  in  whatever  way,  is  Poland.
Poland also has the largest agricultural sector among  all CEC-10.  Nearly one third of
total  agricultural  area  in  the  CEC-10  is  in  Poland  (see  Graph  3).  Romania  has
another quarter  of CEC-10  agricultural  area,  and  the  three  Baltic  countries  jointly
have  one  eighth.  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  taken
together  each  have  one  tenth.  Slovenia,  a  special case  in  many  regards,  not  the
least in its agricultural policies, is rather small, with no more than  1.5 per cent  of total
agricultural area in the CEC-10.
(4)  In  the course  of the  transition  process,  agricultural  output  in  Central  Europe
has declined notably.
After 1989, the overall volume of agricultural output has declined  in  all  CEC.  In some
countries,  agricultural  output has fallen  by forty per cent  or more  (see  Graph  4).  A
number  of  reasons  are  behind  this  development,  including  a  sharp  decline  in  the
sectoral  terms  of  trade  for  agriculture  (resulting  from  de-subsidization);  the  far
reaching  structural  changes  (resulting  from  privatization  and  de-collectivization);
liquidity problems  in  agriculture  and the food  industry;  decline  of  domestic  demand
for  agricultural  products;  breakdown  of  trade  relations  with  former  COMECON
countries;  economic  and  structural  difficulties  in  the  downstream  sectors  (see  for
example  Tangermann  and  Josling,  1994).  As  far  as  different  sub-sectors  in
agriculture  are  concerned,  the  decline  was  particularly  pronounced  in  livestock
production.  Only  recently  has  this  downward  trend  in  agricultural  output  been
reversed,  but  most  countries  in  Central  Europe  have  not  yet  reached  their  pre-
transition  levels  of agricultural  output  again.  One  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this
development  is  that current  levels  of agricultural  output  in  Central  Europe  are  not
indicative of the longer  run production potential  of the region.  At  least it  is clear that
the physical production  potential  in  Central  Europe was  in the past larger than what
current  levels  of  agricultural  output  indicate  (though  this does  not  necessarily  say
that  the  economic  potential  for  larger  volumes  of  agricultural  production  actually
exists).
(5)  Agriculture  has  proved  to  be  relatively robust  during  the  transition  process,
and may have a comparative advantage in Central  Europe.
During the transition process, output has declined not only in agriculture, but in other
sectors  of the  CEC  economies  as  well.  As  a matter  of fact,  relative  to  industrial
output,  the  volume  of  agricultural  production  has  increased  in  most  countries  in
Central  Europe  (see Graph  5).  This  was true  at  least  during  the  early  years  of  the
transition  process,  and  only  more  recently  industrial  output  begins  to  grow  faster
than  agricultural  production  in  some  CEC.  A  full  explanation  of  the  relative
performance  of  different  sectors  in  the  transition  economies  during  the
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argue that agriculture  in Central  Europe  has,  in spite  of all  the  difficulties  it is facing
during  the  transition  process,  shown  a  degree  of  remarkable  robustness  in
comparison  with  other  sectors.  If  this  interpretation  is  correct,  then  agriculture  in
Central  Europe  may  have  a  promising  future  and  the  potential  to  become  an
internationally competitive sector.
(6)  During  the  first  phase  of  the  transition  process,  support  for  agriculture  in
Central  Europe  has  declined  steeply.  More  recently,  however,  CEC
agricultural policies have become more  protectionist.
In  socialist countries,  there was  a pronounced tendency for governments  to  channel
large  scale  subsidies  into  the  agricultural  and  food  system.  When  the  process  of
economic reforms began,  governments of most countries  in  Central  Europe began  to
engage in macro-economic stabilization programmes.  As one element of their efforts
to  reduce  the  deficits of government  budgets,  they greatly  reduced  expenditure  on
agricultural  and  food  policies  (see  Graph  6).  At  the  same  time,  many  agricultural
markets  in  Central  Europe  were  increasingly opened  up to  international  trade,  and
little,  if  any,  protection  for  agriculture  remained.  The  resulting  decline  in  farm
incomes,  exacerbated  by  the  effects of structural  change,  induced  farm  lobbies  to
assert pressure for more  protection and support.  In  most CEC, governments  found it
difficult  to  resist  this  political  pressure,  and  more  recently  they  again  began  to
provide more  support and protection to agriculture through various forms  of domestic
programmes  and trade  policies  (Swinnen  1995;  Hartell  and  Swinnen  1997;  Bojnec
and  Swinnen,  1997).  As  some  of the  policy instruments  now  introduced  in  Central
Europe  resemble  (though  only vaguely)  those traditionally  employed  by  the  CAP,
some authors have commentated that Central  Europe has embarked on a  process of
establishing "CAP-like"  policies (Swinnen  1994).  However, even though there  has, in
recent  years,  been  an  increase  in  agricultural  support  and  protection  in  Central
Europe,  the level of support provided, as measured by  producer subsidy equivalents
(PSE,  expressed  in  per  cent  of  producer  returns),  is  still  significantly  below  that
provided  under  the  CAP  in  the  EU-15  (see  Graph  7).  In  particular,  agricultural
producer prices in  Central  Europe  are still significantly below those in  the  EU,  and in
some cases even below those on world  markets (see Graph 8).
3.  Quantitative Implications of Extending the CAP to Central  Europe
There  is  now a rapidly  growing  literature  on  the  potential  implications  of extending
the CAP to Central  Europe.  One important  ingredient in the debate is analysis of the
quantitative  effects  of  including  Central  Europe  in  the  CAP,  with  or  without  prior
reform  of the  policy. Future  levels of production and use  of agricultural products,  as
affected  by  different  future  policy  scenarios,  will  be  important  as  they  determine
trade  flows,  international  market  prices,  and  budgetary  implications  for  the  EU.  A
number  of  studies  have  made  estimates  of  these  quantitative  implications  in
agriculture of Eastern  enlargement.2 Results differ widely, depending  on  all sorts  of
assumptions  made  regarding  future  market  conditions,  policy  scenarios  and  other
factors.  As  one  indication  of  the  diverging  nature  of  results,  estimated  budget
implications  of  extending  the  CAP  to  Central  Europe  differ  between  2.6  and  66.3
billion dollars per year (USDA  1997).
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for  European  agriculture  is  contained  in  the  Agricultural  Strategy  Paper  issued  by
the EU  Commissioner for agriculture,  Franz Fischler (EU  Commission  1995b).  In this
document  the  Commission  projects  developments  on  agricultural  markets  in  the
CEC-10  and the EU-15 for the years 2000, 2005 and 2010, based on the assumption
that Central  Europe  joins the  EU  in the  year 2000 and  adjusts  its  agricultural  prices
to the CAP  (post-MacSharry  reform)  over a five year period, so that by 2005 the  CAP
fully applies in Central Europe.  The Commission  projects that  under these conditions
the  CEC-10  will  become,  by  2005,  net  exporters  of  cereals  (7.2  million  tonnes),
oilseeds (0.7  million tonnes),  milk (2.6 million tonnes),  beef (0.6  million  tonnes),  and
poultry (0.2 million tonnes),  but will be net importers of sugar (0.4 million  tonnes) and
about self-sufficient in pork. The extra expenditure required to include  the CEC-10  in
the  CAP  would,  according  to  the  Commission,  be  around  12  billion  ECU  (in  1993
prices),  half  of which  would  be  for  MacSharry  compensation  payments  to  CEC-4
farmers.
The Commission's  estimates  were  partly based on  the  European  Simulation  Model
(ESIM).  This  model,  developed  by  the  Economic  Research  Service  of  the  United
States  Department  of  Agriculture  in  collaboration  with  T.  Josling  from  Stanford
University and the present  author (first used  in Tangermann  and Josling,  1994),  is a
partial  equilibrium  model  of  national  and  international  markets  for  some  27
agricultural  and  first  stage  processed  products.  It includes  country/region  modules
for  the  EU-12,  the  three  EFTA  countries  which  have  joined  the  EU,  Norway,
Switzerland,  each  of  the  CEC-4,  the  USA,  other  industrialized  countries,  other
formerly  centrally  planned  countries  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Cross-commodity
linkages,  including  various feed  components  and  their relationships  with  livestock
production,  are  modelled  in  much  detail.  The  model  is  rich  in  policy  detail  and
incorporates  all  important  policy  instruments  of  the  post-MacSharry  and  post-
Uruguay  Round  CAP  (including  intervention  prices,  threshold  prices,  tariffs,  export
subsidies,  quotas,  set-aside,  compensation  payments)  and  their  effects  on  market
behaviour.  Alternative  macro-economic  assumptions  on  income  and  populations
growth  and changes  in real exchange rates can be analyzed.
When  the  model  was  run  for  the  EU  Commission,  relatively  conservative
assumptions  were  made  regarding  future  productivity  improvements  and  supply
responses  in  the  CEC-4.  Moreover,  the  assumption  was  made  that  quotas  are
imposed  on  milk and  sugar production  in the  CEC-4.  The volumes  of these quotas
were  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  respective  export  subsidy  commitments
accepted  in  the  WTO  by  the  CEC-4.  For  future  CAP  prices  some  decline  in  real
terms was assumed.  Of course this is only one constellation of assumptions one can
make, and results will differ significantly depending on the scenario one is analysing.
The  fundamental  problem  one  is  faced  with  when  analysing  the  agricultural
implications  of  Eastern  enlargement  is  the  lack  of  firm  knowledge  on  future
conditions in agriculture and the overall economy of the countries in Central  Europe.
To  show the  large  importance  of varying  assumptions  on  central  factors,  we  shall
present here the results of different runs using that same model.3  In a base run ("no
CAP")  we assume  that the CEC-4  do  not align their policies with  the  CAP,  keeping
their agricultural policy prices constant  in real terms at 1993 levels. Against this base
we  set four different  runs in  which accession  to the EU  and adoption  of the  CAP are
assumed.  In  these accession  runs,  we  assume  that the  CEC-4  align  their  policies
gradually with  the  CAP,  beginning  in  1998 and  reaching full  CAP  levels in  2003.  In
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into  EU  agricultural  markets.4 The  CAP  is assumed to  remain as it now stands  after
the MacSharry  reform,  with minor further reductions  of real  policy  prices  in  the years
to come.
In  the first  three  of these  accession  runs,  the  CEC-4  are  assumed  to  recover soon
from  the  production declines which  occurred  during the early  years  of the transition
process.5  The first accession  run  ("CAP  w/o quotas") assumes  that  CAP  prices  are
adopted  by the CEC-4,  but that no supply control  measures apply  in  Central  Europe
(i.e.  no quotas on  sugar and milk,  no set-aside).  This run  is  thought to  illustrate  the
full  potential  supply  pressure  that  might  originate  in  Central  Europe.  The  second
accession  run  ("CAP  w quotas") assumes  that quotas  on  sugar and  milk production
are  imposed  on  the  CEC-4,  roughly  in  accordance  with  their  WTO  export  subsidy
commitments.  At the same  time,  set-aside at a rate  of 10 per cent6  is  required  in  the
CEC-4,  as  a  quid quo  pro  for  MacSharry  compensation  payments  which  are  also
assumed to be extended to the CEC-4.7
The  third  accession  run  ("CAP  revaluation")  assumes  that  the  currencies  of  the
CEC-4 appreciate quite  strongly in real terms  in the years to come.  Specifically,  it is
assumed  that  both  EU  and  CEC-4  exchange  rates  adjust  to  their  1995  purchasing
power  parities  in  real  terms  until  2005.  This  scenario  implies  that the  ECU  devalues
slightly,  whereas  the  CEC-4  currencies  revalue  substantially  against  the  US$.  The
strongest revaluation takes place in the Czech Republic and Slovakia with 7 per cent per
year, while the Forint and the Zloty appreciate by only 2 per cent per year.8 As a result of
these  currency  developments,  the  price  gap  between  the  EU  and  the  CEC-4  is
significantly reduced, and alignment with the CAP  requires  much smaller price increases
in the CEC-4. 9 The  last accession run  ("CAP no recovery") explores the effects of lower
productivity  in  CEC  agriculture.  In this  run  it is assumed  that productivity  in  the  CEC-4
does  not  recover from  the  decline which  occurred  in the  early  years  of the  transition
period,  though  supply  is  still  assumed  to  respond  to  price  signals,  with  the  same
elasticities  used  in  the  other  runs.  No  quotas  on  sugar  and  milk  in  the  CEC-4  are
assumed in the  latter two runs, but compensation payments are introduced  in the CEC-4
and set-aside at the rate of 5 per cent is required.
Implications  of  these  scenarios  for  CEC-4  net  exports  of  selected  agricultural
products are  shown  in Graphs  9 to  12.10  Also  shown  in these  graphs  are  actual  net
exports  in  1989  and  1994,  as well  as  maximum  levels  of subsidized  exports  under
the  WTO  commitments  of  the  CEC-4.11  For  cereals  (Graph  9),  our  projection
suggests  that even  without inclusion  in the  CAP,  net  exports  from  the  CEC-4  may
grow to nearly 4  million tonnes  by 2005. This volume  is above  the WTO  constraint
on  subsidized  exports.  However,  that  does  not  pose  a  problem  as  under  this
scenario  domestic  prices  in  the  CEC-4  are  so  low  that  export  subsidies  are  not
needed.  If the  CAP  is  extended  to  the  CEC-4  without  quotas  and  set-aside,  our
estimate is that net exports of cereals from the CEC-4  could grow to as much  as 13
million  tonnes,  while  application  of  set-aside  in  the  CEC-4  would  still  leave  net
exports  of  9 million  tonnes.  Compliance  with  the  WTO  constraint  on  subsidized
cereal  exports would  then be  seriously threatened  (see  discussion  in  the  following
section).  Less optimistic assumptions  regarding  recovery  of CEC-4  agriculture  would
reduce  cereals  net  exports  somewhat,  though  not  enough  to  meet  the  WTO
constraints.  However, should the currencies of the CEC-4 appreciate significantly (in
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and no problems with WTO commitments  on subsidized exports would arise.
Our projections  for sugar and  milk  (results  shown  only for  butter)  demonstrate  the
extent  to  which  quotas  imposed  on  CEC-4  production  would  suppress  the  supply
potential  which would otherwise  be triggered  by extending  high  CAP  support  prices
for these products to the CEC-4 (see  Graphs  10 and  11).  For both sugar  and butter;
assumptions  regarding recovery  of CEC  agriculture have  little effect  on  net exports.
Exchange  rate  assumptions,  though,  again  matter  very  much.  However,  even  if
significant  appreciation  of  CEC-4  currencies  is  assumed,  both  sugar  and  milk
production in the CEC-4  would need  to be constrained  by quotas  in  order to honour
WTO  constraints on  subsidized  exports.  Beef  prices  in  the  CEC-4  would  also  rise
significantly with  inclusion  in  the  CAP,  and  exports  from  the  CEC-4  would  then  far
exceed  the WTO  constraint on subsidized exports  (Graph  12).  Even  less optimistic
assumptions  on  recovery  of  CEC  agriculture,  and  significant  appreciation  of  CEC
currencies do not fundamentally change that result.
Our estimates of the budget implications of these alternative scenarios  are shown  in
Graph  13.  If the  CEC-4  are  not  included  in  the  CAP  and  keep  their  policy  prices
constant in  real terms  (at the  1993  level),  then the budget expenditure  required  for
their agricultural market and trade policies is low.  However, if their prices are aligned
with those under the CAP  without supply controls being imposed,  expenditure  in  the
CEC-4  might grow to around  13 billion ECU  in 2005 (in  1993 prices). 12 Application  of
quotas  and  set-aside  in  the  CEC-4  would  save  budget  outlays.  At  the  same  time,
though,  extension  of  compensation  payments  to  CEC-4  farmers  would  require
additional  expenditure.  Taking everything together,  full  inclusion  of  the CEC-4  in  all
CAP  measures would,  according  to our estimate,  raise  expenditure  in  the CEC-4  to
around  15  billion  ECU. 13  If CEC  agriculture  recovers  less  well  from  the  transition
decline,  the  budget  implications  are  somewhat  less  pronounced.  Appreciation  of
CEC  currencies could reduce the budgetary impact of extending  the CAP to  Central
Europe significantly.
One of the lessons from such  simulation runs  is that macro-economic developments
and,  in particular, exchange  rates,  matter  very much  for the agricultural  implications
of Eastern  enlargement.  However, such macro-economic  developments  are also  not
completely  exogenous  to  the  agricultural  policy  sphere.  Future  exchange  rate
developments  in  Central  Europe  will  not  only depend  on  intrinsic macro-economic
developments  in the countries concerned.  They can also  be  directly affected by the
process of acceding to  the EU  and  adopting the CAP.  In particular, if the CEC  align
their  agricultural  policies  with  those  of  the  EU,  driving  up  the  level  of  their
agricultural  protection and  support towards that currently prevailing under the  CAP,
this will  have the  well-known  protection  effect of making  their real  exchange  rates
appreciate. This exchange rate effect would occur while the CEC  are still outside the
EU,  but raise agricultural protection to meet the EU  level. In addition, when they join
the  EU,  a  second  round  of  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  can  be  expected,
resulting from  inclusion  in  the  "financial solidarity" as  provided  under the  CAP.  As
long as the CEC are still outside the EU,  they have to finance their agricultural policy
expenditure  from  their  own  national  budgets.  However,  as soon as they have joined
the EU,  all  agricultural  policy expenditure  related to  market and trade  policies  will  be
financed  out of the EU  budget (to which the CEC will  make only small contributions,
given the low level  of their GDP).  Thus, from the moment the CEC  are fully included
120in the  CAP  there will be  a  financial  transfer to  them from  the  EU  budget,  adding  to
the flow of foreign currencies  into the CEC.
To  see what  the  magnitude  of these  exchange  rate effects  might  be,  consider  the
case  of Hungary.  Banse  (1996)  has  developed  a dynamic  CGE  model  for  Hungary
which allows the analysing of the transformation process  in that country.14 That same
model  has  also  been  run  to  investigate  the  macro-economic  implications  of
Hungary's  accession  to  the  CAP  (Banse  and  Tangermann,  1996).  The  accession
scenario,  regarding  the  process  and  time-frame  of  adoption  of  the  CAP,  is
essentially the  same  as  the  one  described  above for  analysis  based  on  the  ESIM
model.  Only the development of some macro-economic  indicators  resulting  from  that
model  run  is presented  here (see  Graph  14).  Results are  shown  relative to  those of
the base run where Hungary is assumed not to accede to the  EU  and  not to align  its
policies with the CAP.  Gradual adoption of the CAP  by  Hungary  on a  national  basis
(i.e.  before  accession to  the  EU),  in  particular  raising  Hungary's  agricultural  tariffs
and export subsidies to EU  levels, would,  in that analysis, drive  up the real exchange
rate  of  the  Forint  by  9.5  per  cent  (see  exchange  rate  for  2004).  This  currency
appreciation  results simply from the  protection  effect. When  Hungary  then joins  the
EU  (in 2005)  and begins to benefit from  "financial solidarity" under the CAP,  the real
exchange rate of the Forint appreciates by another two percentage points, due to the
transfer of EU  budget expenditure to Hungary.1 5 Inclusion  in the  "financial  solidarity"
under the current  CAP would also allow investments in  Hungary  to increase  by  more
than two per cent, and would add around 1.5 per cent to Hungary's GDP.16
In other words,  accession to the CAP  can have significant macro-economic  effects in
Central  Europe.  The  nature of these  macro-economic  repercussions,  though,  could
be  to  reduce  the  agricultural  market,  trade  and  budget  effects  of  Eastern
enlargement.  In particular,  if accession to the EU  should result  in  an  appreciation  of
real  exchange  rates  in  Central  Europe,  the  gap  between  agricultural  prices  in
Central  Europe  and the  EU  would  be further  reduced,  and  hence  the expansionary
effect  of  extending  the  CAP  to  Central  Europe  might  be  smaller  than  otherwise
assumed.
In summary,  there  is  still much  uncertainty regarding  the quantitative  implications of
extending the CAP  to Central  Europe.  So far too little  is known  about the extent and
speed  of the future  process  of recovery  from  the  agricultural  output  decline which
occurred  during  the  early  stages  of  transition;  about  future  domestic  policies  in
Central  Europe  before  accession  to  the  EU;  about  the  extent  to  which  all  CAP
measures  will  be  extended  to  Central  Europe;  and  about  future  macro-economic
developments  in  Central  Europe.  For  the  years  to  come,  agricultural  economists
have a rich research agenda  in  this area,  and analytical  results will  keep changing
as the process of preparing for Eastern  enlargement goes on.
4.  Implications for the Future of the CAP
Whatever the particular set of projections  is one wants to  subscribe to, there  is  little
doubt  that  the  quantitative  implications  of  extending  the  current  CAP  to  Central
Europe can be dramatic, and  a threat to the future of the CAP.  In a situation  like  that,
a  number  of strategic  decisions  have  to  be  taken.  Let  us  consider  some  of  these
decisions, starting from the general process of Eastern  enlargement  and  progressing
to the detail of the CAP.
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Some  (though fortunately  not  many)  agricultural  lobby  groups  might  prefer  to  drop
the  project  of  Eastern  enlargement  altogether,  hoping  that  the  CAP  might  then
survive  intact.  However,  that fundamental  decision will  not be  taken  on  agricultural
grounds  - and  indeed  has  long  been  taken,  positively.  Moreover,  even  in  the
absence  of  Eastern  enlargement  there  are  good,  if  not  overwhelming  reasons  for
reforming the CAP, to which we shall come back below.
A second  decision  concerns the  inclusion  of agriculture  in  the  process  of  Eastern
enlargement.  Is it conceivable that the countries of Central  Europe could join the  EU,
but  leave  their  agriculture  outside  the  Single  Market  and  the  CAP,  continuing  to
pursue, and finance, their agricultural  policies on a national basis?  A proposition  like
that would  appear  to  be  a  complete  non-starter.  Not  only  would  such  a  "solution"
generate  all  sorts  of technical  and  legal  problems,  it would  make  the  countries  of
Central  Europe  second-class members  of the  Union.  Given  the  large  importance  of
agriculture to the economies of Central  Europe,  and their pronounced  interest  in free
access to  agricultural  markets  in  Western  Europe,  it is  plainly  inconceivable  that
exclusion  of  agriculture  from  the  process  of  Eastern  enlargement  would  ever  be
politically feasible. Moreover,  it would not make any economic sense.
A third decision relates to the time horizon for,  and process  of accession  by,  Central
Europe.  Many  agricultural  policy makers  in  the  EU appear to  believe that  pressure
on  the  CAP  would  be  the  less  the  later  Central  Europe  joins  the  Union.  Yet,
agricultural  issues will probably  play only a  minor role when  it comes  to deciding  on
the time schedule for Eastern enlargement.  To  a large extent,  timing  will  depend  on
foreign  policy  considerations,  on  the  ability  of  the  Union  to  revise  its  institutional
structures to fit an  even  larger  number  of member  states,  and  on  the  progress  the
individual countries in Central  Europe make  in terms of establishing  a stable political
and economic system  and creating the  necessary  institutional and legal  framework.
However,  at  a lower level of decision making, timing  may well  become  a "technical"
issue  related,  among  others,  to  agricultural  implications.  In  particular, there  will  be
the question of whether or not there should  be a transition  period  after accession. In
the  early  rounds of  EC  enlargement,  until  accession  by  Spain  and  Portugal,  such
transition  periods  (lasting  up  to  ten  years)  were  used  to  spread  adjustment  of
agricultural  prices  in the entrant countries  towards those of the existing  Community
over  a  number  of years.  Many  agricultural  policy makers  in  the  EU  argue  that  the
same  approach  should  be  used for  Eastern  enlargement.  They  appear  to  believe
that the agricultural  policy problems caused  by Eastern enlargement would  somehow
dissipate during such a transition period.  It is somewhat hard to understand the logic
of such beliefs. The longer the countries of Central  Europe have time to recover from
the  traumatic  process  of  transition,  the  better  equipped  their  farmers  will  be  to
compete with those of Western Europe.  In any case, at the end of a transition period
the  consequences  of  enlargement  for  Europe's  agriculture  will  have  to  be  faced.
Waiting until such time will not make the problems disappear.
However,  one  also  has  to consider the  fact that an  agricultural  transition  period  of
the traditional type  is an approach of the past, no  longer consistent with the realities
of the  borderless Single  Market  in  Europe.  Gradual  adjustment  of agricultural  prices
during  a transition  period  requires  the  ability  to  maintain  a  price  gap  between  the
entrants  and  the  existing  Union.  In  the  past,  special  agricultural  trade  taxes  and
subsidies  ("accession compensatory  amounts") were  used for  that  purpose,  levied
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Community  (and  included  in  border  measures  on  trade  between  entrants  and  third
countries).17  Border  controls  no  longer exist  in the  Single  Market.  Hence,  when  the
EFTA  countries joined the Union,  and  the  Single Market,  on  1 January,  1995,  their
agricultural prices were  immediately adjusted to CAP  prices in what was called a "big
bang"  fashion.  When  it  comes  to  Eastern  enlargement,  the  borderless  market
principle  will  probably  also  prevail,  at  least for  trade  in  goods.  Under  the  existing
association agreements  between the Union  and the CEC,  nearly  all border measures
on  non-agricultural trade will  be abolished within  the  next few years  at any  rate.  As
far  as  technical  standards  are  concerned,  the  countries  in  Central  Europe,  very
much  supported  by  the  Union,  are already  engaged  in  serious  efforts  to  meet  the
requirements of the Single Market soon.  Would  it then be possible to maintain,  after
Eastern  enlargement,  border  controls  on  trade  in  goods  only  for  agricultural
products?  This  is hardly  conceivable. After  all,  it  is technically  infeasible  to  control
only certain types of trade.  Nobody can  tell whether a  given  truck or ship transports
agricultural products or other goods,  and hence all trade would have to  be controlled
if border measures  were to  be maintained  on agricultural trade between  the entrants
from  Central  Europe and the existing Union.  The agricultural tail  would then wag  the
overall  economy  dog  - a  completely  undesirable  situation.  Moreover,  a  transition
period  during  which  the  countries  of  Central  Europe  are  denied  free  access  to
Europe's  agricultural  markets would seriously disappoint these countries,  and  would
therefore be undesirable for political reasons, too.
Hence  it is best to face the expectation that the countries of Central  Europe will  have
free access to EU  agricultural  markets,  and the CAP,  on the day they join  the Union.
What  can  then be  done  to  avoid the  dramatic  quantitative  implications  for markets
and  the  budget?  One  further  escape  from  the  need  to  change  the  CAP
fundamentally  in  this situation  might  be  seen  in  a tightening,  and  extension  to  new
products,  of supply  controls  (quotas,  set-aside),  or  at  least  the  imposition  of such
tight controls on  the new member  states from  Central  Europe.  Apart from  the  lack of
economic logic in such an approach,  it would  not even work technically. The central
aim  of supply  management  in  agriculture  is  to  maintain  high  support  prices.  High
support prices require  high tariffs,  because  imports from  the rest of the world  would
otherwise  undermine  domestic  price  support.  However,  after  the  Uruguay  Round,
countries are no  longer free to  set their agricultural tariffs as they like.  In the EU-15,
most  agricultural  tariffs are  currently  still  high  enough  to  underpin  existing  support
prices,  though  their  required  gradual  reduction  over  time  may  well  begin  to  exert
pressure  on  some  products  towards  the  end  of  the  current  implementation  period
(Tangermann,  1995). At the time  Eastern enlargement  begins, further reductions in
agricultural tariffs will probably have been agreed to  in the agricultural  mini-round to
be  initiated  under  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  Agriculture  in  1999  (Josling,
Tangermann,  Warley, 1996).
Most countries of Central  Europe, to the extent that they are already members  of the
WTO,  have tariff bindings much  below those of the  EU  (see  Graph  15).  Unilaterally
these countries can,  at any rate, not raise their levels of price support to  match price
levels under the CAP.  When they join the EU,  negotiations will have to be held in the
WTO  on  how  to  merge  their  WTO  commitments  with  those  of  the  EU.  It is  highly
unlikely  that  the  trading  partners  of  the  EU  will  allow  the  Union  to  absorb  the
countries  of Central  Europe while  raising their agricultural  tariffs  to the  EU  level.  On
the  contrary,  Eastern  enlargement  will  probably  require  the  EU  to  accept  further
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prevent the EU from  using the "easy"  solution of more  and tightened  supply controls
in order to avoid changes to the CAP.
All this  said,  it is  nearly logically impossible  to  escape the conclusion  that  the  CAP
will  have  to  be  further  reformed  in  the  context  of  Eastern  enlargement.  However,
before  discussing the  options for  reform,  let  us pause a  moment  and  consider  that
apparently inevitable conclusion one last time,  in order to do justice  to those who still
believe that there  is no need to change  the  CAP  fundamentally. To  a  large  extent,
the  view  that  CAP  reform  is  necessary  in  the  process  of  preparing  for  Eastern
enlargement is based on projections of the quantitative implications for agriculture of
extending  the  Union  to  Central  Europe.  The  consequences  for the  EU  budget  and
the effects on  international trade are particularly important factors  in that equation.  If
the  projections are wrong and the  quantitative implications are  less dramatic, would
CAP  reform then not be necessary?
As  reported  in  the  previous section,  estimates  of the  extra  expenditure  required  to
include  Central  Europe  in  the  CAP  vary  widely.  However,  let  us just consider  the
latest available estimate of the EU  Commission,  12  billion  ECU CAP expenditure  for
the  CEC-10.  According  to  the  EU  Commission  (1995b),  agricultural  policy
expenditure for the EU-15  is projected to  be around  42  billion  ECU  (in  1993 prices)
in  2005.  Hence  the  Commission's  own  estimate  implies  that  Eastern  enlargement
results in an increase  by around  28 per cent of agricultural  policy expenditure  in  the
Union.  Is  this  a  large  increase?  It  certainly  is,  relative  to  existing  budgetary
arrangements for the CAP.
Under  the current budget  guideline for the CAP,  agricultural spending  of the  Union
must  not increase,  over time,  by more  than 74  per cent of the growth  rate  of GDP  in
the EU  (in  real terms).  That same factor was applied when the EFTA countries joined
the EU  in  1995. At the time,  the budget for the CAP was augmented  by 74  per cent
of  the  rate  of  increase  of  Union  GDP  as  a  result  of  enlargement.  If  the  same
procedure  were  adopted  on  Eastern  enlargement,  the  budget  for  the  CAP  would
grow  only  minimally.  At the  moment  the  CEC-10  have  a  little  more  than three  per
cent of GDP  in  the  EU-15.  Let us assume that GDP  in  Central  Europe grows  much
faster  than  in  the  EU-15  and  that  at  the  time  when  Eastern  enlargement  is
accomplished  the  CEC-10  have  seven  per  cent  of  GDP  of  the  EU-15.  Under  the
current budget mechanism,  CAP  expenditure would then be allowed to increase  by a
bit more than five per cent on Eastern enlargement. This is less than one fifth of the
increase required  according to the Commission's  estimate.  One can well argue that
this  is  a  too  technical  view  of  the  process,  and  that  focusing  on  the  agricultural
budget cost of Eastern enlargement  is not helpful in view of the political significance
of  Eastern  enlargement  and  considering  the  many  benefits  it  will  provide  to  the
existing  member states (Buckwell  et al.,  1994).  However,  it  is less than  certain that
governments of countries  in Western  Europe will  be happy to spend that much  more
on a policy which many of them feel is in urgent need of overhaul anyhow.
As far as trade  implications of extending the  CAP  to Central  Europe are  concerned,
available  estimates  also  differ  widely.  However,  in  this  regard,  too,  even  a  wide
margin of error does little to change the policy conclusions fundamentally.  The major
aspect  to  be  considered  in  this  regard  is  the  existence  of  WTO  commitments
regarding subsidized exports. Even  if CEC-O10  net exports after accession to the CAP
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Commission,  they would,  for many products,  still be far above  the (aggregate)  WTO
commitments  of the countries concerned.  Consider the case  of cereals.  Poland,  the
Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  and  Slovenia  have  zero  commitments  for  subsidized
cereals exports.  Hungary can  export  1.141  million tonnes of wheat and  0.164  million
tonnes  of corn  with  subsidies  in  2000.  Romania  has  a  commitment  not  to  exceed
0.290  million  tonnes  of subsidized  grain  exports  in  the  year  2004  (GATT,  1994).
Thus,  on aggregate,  these CEC can export a maximum  of about  1.6 million  tonnes of
cereals with  export subsidies around the year 2000.  In the  mini-round  of  agricultural
negotiations  in  the WTO,  this  amount  is likely to be  further  reduced.  As  in  the  case
of tariffs,  the  trading  partners  of the  EU  will  want  to  make  sure  that  the  aggregate
commitments  of  all  member  states  are  not  relaxed  on  Eastern  enlargement.  Thus
enlargement  will  not  augment  EU  commitments  on  subsidized  cereals  exports  by
more  than  1.6  million  tonnes.  However,  even the  EU  Commission  projects  that  net
exports  of cereals  from  the  CEC-10  will  be  above  7  million  tonnes  in  2005,  and
nearly  11  million  tonnes  in  2010  (EU  Commission,  1995b).  The  margin  of  error  in
these  projections  would  have  to  be  very  wide  if  inconsistency  with  the  WTO
commitments were not to be found.
More  fundamentally,  though,  the  same conclusion holds  for the  EU-15  even  in  the
absence of Eastern  enlargement.  Take the case of cereals  again.  The WTO  export
subsidy commitments  for wheat and coarse grains on aggregate for the EU-15  stand
at  23.41  million  tonnes for 2000,  and  will  probably have  to  be  reduced  thereafter.
The  EU  Commission  projects  net  export  availabilities  in  the  EU-15  of  30  million
tonnes in 2000,  more than 40 million tonnes  in 2005,  and  nearly 55  million tonnes in
2010.18  Thus,  as  long  as  the  EU  has  to  subsidize  cereal  exports  it will  be  find  it
increasingly difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  comply with  its  WTO  commitments.  The
situation  is  similar  (though  somewhat  less  dramatic)  for  a  number  of  other
agricultural  products.  In  other words,  even  if agricultural  production  and  net  export
availability  in  Central  Europe  were  to  grow  less  than  projected,  added  to  likely
market  trends  in  the  EU-15  the  conclusion  is  relatively  clear. The  Union  will  have
major difficulties in complying with  its WTO  commitments  in agriculture - if it does not
change the CAP.
What  are,  then,  the  options  for  reforming  the  CAP?  Essentially  there  is  only  one
strategy  which  can  prepare  Europe's  agricultural  and  food  sector  successfully  for
Eastern  enlargement,  and  which  makes  economic  sense  at  the  same  time.  This
strategy aims at improving the competitiveness  of EU  agriculture  so that  it no longer
needs government support. Without going into detail  (see Josling and Tangermann,
1995,  and  Marsh  and  Tangermann,  1996),  that  strategy  would  have  three  major
elements.  First,  CAP  support  prices  are  reduced  so  that  export  subsidies  are  no
longer  necessary.  Second,  supply management  (quotas,  set-aside)  is  abandoned.
Third,  compensation  payments  to  farmers,  to  the  extent  they  are  considered
necessary by agricultural  policy makers,  are  completely decoupled from  production,
and their duration is limited.
A  reduction  of CAP  support  prices  towards  the  level of world  market  prices  is  the
only way  the need for export subsidies  can  be eliminated.  At the same  time  it is the
only policy which allows Europe's farmers,  in the West and in the East, to participate
in  the future  growth  of world  markets  for agricultural  products.  As  long  as  Europe
needs export  subsidies,  its  volume  of agricultural  exports  will  be  constrained  by  the
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bind  the  volume  of  exports.  Agriculture  in  Central  Europe  is  likely  to  be  so
competitive  that  it  could  well  export  growing  volumes  to  world  markets,  without
export subsidies,  if only the CAP would  allow it to do so.  If the volume  of agricultural
exports  from  Central  Europe  needs  to  be  constrained  because  the  EU  cannot
eliminate  export  subsidies,  then  Central  Europe's  resource  base  will  not  be  fully
utilised.
Removal  of  supply  management  under  the  CAP  is  a  direct  corollary  of  the
elimination  of export subsidies.  If exports  are  not  subsidized there  is  no  reason  to
constrain  domestic  agricultural  production  in  Europe,  neither  from  a  budgetary  nor
from  a WTO  point of view.  Moreover,  it does  not make economic sense to  integrate
farmers from  Central Europe  into the common agricultural market  of the Union,  but at
the same time to subject their production to quotas so that they cannot compete with
farmers in Western  Europe.
As  far  as  individual  agricultural  products  are  concerned,  the  political  difficulties  of
achieving  a  removal  of export subsidies  and  an  elimination  of  supply  management
will  differ from  case to  case.  In  the  cereals  sector,  EU  prices  after  the  MacSharry
reform  are  already  relatively close to world  market  levels  (and  have  recently  even
been  kept below world  market  prices).  There  are now a  growing  number of farmers
and  agricultural  policy  makers  in  the  EU  who  are  prepared  to  give  up  on  export
subsidies for cereals,  as a quid pro quo for eliminating the need  for set-aside. They
find  political  support  among  those  producers  of  pork  and  poultry  products  who
(rightly)  believe  they  are  capable  of  exporting  without  subsidies  only  if they  get
access  to  feed  grain  at  world  market  prices.  In  the  cases  of  milk  and  sugar,  EU
prices would  have  to  come  down  more  before  the  level  of  world  market  prices  is
reached,  and  political  opposition  against  fundamental  CAP  reform  is  strongest  in
those sectors.  On the other hand,  prices for these  two  products  in  Central  Europe
are particularly well  below those in the  EU,  and  hence the  need for  reform  in  these
two sectors is even more  pronounced than for other products.
The need for decoupling compensation  payments (existing  and new, if unavoidable)
from  production  also  increases  with  Eastern  enlargement.  There  is  general
agreement that farmers  in  Central  Europe  should  not receive  such  payments.  Past
reductions  of  CAP  support  prices,  which  were  the  reason  to  introduce  such
payments under the MacSharry reform,  did  not affect farmers in Central  Europe,  and
future  price  reductions  should  be  made  before  Central  Europe  joins  the  Union.
Moreover,  EU  payments  to  farmers  in  Central  Europe  would  distort  income
distribution  between  agriculture  and  the  rest  of  the  economy.  However,  if
compensation  payments  are  not  made  in  one  part  of the  enlarged  Union,  severe
distortions  of  allocation  can  only  be  avoided  if  they  are  fully  decoupled  from
production  and  resource  use  in  other  parts of the  Union.  Full  decoupling  requires,
among others, limiting the duration of these payments because otherwise  they effect
the  functioning  of  factor  (in  particular  labour)  markets.  Moreover,  the  only
justification  for  such  payments  can  be  that  they  help  farmers  to  tide  over  the
adjustment to a fundamental change in policy, and that justification does not support
permanent  payments.
If  export  subsidies  are  eliminated,  supply  management  is  abandoned  and
compensation  payments are  decoupled,  the CAP has been  reformed  in  a way which
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Farmers  in  the West and the East of an enlarged Union can  fully use their productive
potential,  and  agricultural  policy  no  longer  gets  in  the  way  of  other  sectors  of  the
economy.  Removing  the  agricultural  "land  mines"  from  the  road  towards  Eastern
enlargement will not be politically easy. But the benefits will  be extensive.
5.  Conclusions
The  prospect  of  Eastern  enlargement  is  about  to  change  the  environment  for
agricultural  policy  making  in  the  European  Union  fundamentally.  In  an  enlarged
Union,  agriculture will  carry  such  a large weight that traditional  agricultural  policies
as  pursued  under  the  CAP  will  no  longer  fit.  With  Eastern  enlargement,  the
productive potential of EU agriculture may expand dramatically. The farming  industry
in Central  Europe is highly competitive,  much  more  so than  large  parts of agriculture
in the EU-15.  In the absence  of CAP  reform,  agricultural  expenditure would  grow so
much  that other more  productive policies might suffer. Moreover,  agricultural  exports
from an enlarged Union with an unchanged CAP would exceed the WTO constraints,
and  would  seriously  threaten  the  stability  of the  new  international  trading  order  in
agriculture after the Uruguay Round.
To  avoid  such  problems,  the  EU  will  have  to  change  its  agricultural  policies
fundamentally.  Delaying  the  process  of  enlargement  would  not  help,  nor  is  an
extended  transition  period  after accession  of the  countries  from  Central  Europe  a
viable  solution. Agricultural  policy makers in  the EU  should face the new  prospects,
and  should engage  in  CAP  reform.  Export  subsidies  should  be  eliminated,  supply
management  should  be  abandoned,  and  compensation  payments  should  be
decoupled.
In  the  views  of the  EU  Commission  (1995b),  such  changes  to  the  CAP  amount  to
"radical  reform"  (attributed  by  the  Commission  to  "a  number  of  high  ranking
agricultural  economists"). The Commission  prefers  to "develop  the  1992  approach",
i.e.  to  complete  the  MacSharry  reform  of  the  CAP.  However,  much  of  what  the
Commission  describes  under  that  approach  shows  that  the  gulf  between  "radical
reform"  and  its  own  vision  of  how  the  CAP  should  be  prepared  for  Eastern
enlargement  is  less  wide  than  what  is  suggested.  In  other  words,  even  the
Commission appears to be convinced that a very fundamental  reform  of the  CAP  is a
prerequisite  for  Eastern  enlargement.  It will  be  interesting  to  watch  the  political
process from  which this reform  will emerge.
This  process  is  now well  underway,  and the  EU  Commission  is expected  to  submit
proposals  for  the  future  CAP  later  in  1997.  It is  important  that  reforms  are  then
decided  soon, for two reasons.  First, the countries  in  Central  Europe  need  to  know
how the  CAP  will look when they join the  Union. As  long  as  support and  protection
for  farmers  under  the  CAP  is  high,  the  temptation  to  raise  levels  of  support  and
protection  in Central  Europe  will  be  even  more  difficult to  resist than  it is already.
Second,  and  closely  related,  if  reform  of  the  CAP  is  delayed  until  Eastern
enlargement  begins  to  take  place  it  will  be  so  more  difficult  to  achieve.  Once  the
countries  of  Central  Europe  have  joined  the  Union  they  may  have  an  immediate
interest  in  maintaining  high  levels  of  support  and  protection.  As  agricultural
exporters,  and  small  contributors  to the EU  budget, they can only benefit  from  being
127included in an  unreformed  CAP.  Hence after  Eastern  enlargement  it may be too  late
for a  reform of the CAP.
However,  CAP  reform  is  necessary not  only because  of  Eastern  enlargement.  The
CAP  is outdated even for the current  Union.  The MacSharry  reform  has not  sufficed
to bring it in  line with  the realities  and needs of the times.  In a  post-Uruguay  Round
world,  farmers  who  rely on  export subsidies and  supply management  are fighting  a
losing  battle.  The  United  States  has  understood  this  message,  and  has  recently
changed  its  agricultural  policies  fundamentally. -Europe  should  not  wait  too  long
before it reforms the CAP  in a similarly sweeping way.
1  This  paper draws heavily on Tangermann  (1996).
2  For a brief survey of some of these studies, see Tangermann  (1996).  See also USDA  (1997).
3  I am greatly indebted to Wolfgang Munch for his contribution to the  model development  and for
making the model  runs presented  here. Wolfgang  Munch is currently  in the  process of updating
the model to a  more  recent base period, and  adding more  Central European  countries to the
model.
In  2003, policy  prices (such as intervention prices)  in the CEC-4  are assumed  to be aligned  with
the CAP, while in 2004 market prices are assumed to be identical with those  in the EU-15 as a
result of accession.  Where the  net trade position of an individual acceding country  is different  from
that of the enlarged  EU,  the market price  in that country can change  on accession. This happens,
for example, in Poland where the wheat price is at the threshold  level  in  2003 because Poland  is
projected to be a net importer of wheat, while the price drops to the  intervention  level  in  2004
because the  EU on aggregate  is a  net exporter of wheat.
Recovery is modelled  through supply curve shifters, essentially shifting supply curves from  1997
onwards  back to where they were  in  1989-91.
6  Because of the exemption  of "small" producers from  set-aside, only  1.4 per cent of the  relevant
acreage would actually be set aside in Poland in this case.
In  its market and  budget projections  in the Agricultural  Strategy  Paper, the  EU Commission
(1995b) assumes that set-aside (at a  rate of 15 per cent)  applies in  Central Europe,  but that
MacSharry compensation  payments are not extended to the CEC.  The combination of these two
assumptions lacks logic, as under the  CAP farmers  have no incentive to set-aside land  if
compensation  payments are not made.
For details on these assumptions and the reasoning behind them,  see Bojnec,  Munch and  Swinnen
(forthcoming), where  results of this run are  also presented  in more detail.
SFor technical  reasons,  in this run, full  alignment  with the CAP and accession  to the  EU take place
one year later than in the other runs shown here.  However, this does not affect the final outcome
in the year 2005.
10  For more detailed  results, see Munch (1995).
"  WTO commitments apply, of course, to each of the CEC-4  individually. What is shown in the
graphs is the sum of their individual commitments. For a detailed analysis of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, see Josling, Tangermann, Warley  (forthcoming).
12  Budget projections provided here include rough estimates of net expenditure  on products and
policies not modelled in ESIM. These estimates are  based on expenditure proportions in the.EU-
15.
13  When  comparing  our estimate with that of the EU  Commission it should  be noted that we have
included  the CEC-4 only,  while the Commission estimate applies to the  aggregate of the  CEC-10.
12814  For more  detailed information  on  the model structure  and  mode of analysis, see Banse  (1996).
Summary information  is also  provided in  Banse  and Tangermann  (1996).
15  Note that the accession effect on the exchange rate  (and on other macro-economic  indicators)
shown  here is only the isolated  effect of extending the "financial solidarity" to Hungary.  As
accession to the EU takes  place, there will  also be other financial flows  from the EU  to  Hungary
(e.g. under  regional policies),  and in  addition there  may be an  increase  in foreign  direct
investments  made  in  Hungary.  Effects of these additional currency flows are  not taken  into
account in the  analysis presented  here.
16  Investments grow as substitution of EU  budget expenditure for national  government expenditure
on  agricultural  policy eases the government deficit in  Hungary and  results in higher savings. GDP
rises as a direct consequence  of foreign transfers to Hungary, and  in  response to a relaxation of
macro-economic constraints resulting from  these larger transfers.
17  For the case of Portugal's accession,  see Josling and Tangermann  (1987).
8  For comparison with WTO export subsidy commitments,  gross imports  (around  7  million tonnes)
have to  be  added and  food aid  (1.3  million tonnes)  has to  be subtracted from these  net export
figures. Inconsistency with WTO  commitments  is then even more  pronounced.
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Graph  10:  CEC-4  Net Exports of Sugar under Alternative
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CEC-4  Net Exports of Butter under Alternative Policy
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